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THE SAME SEX MARRIAGE DEBATE FOR
DUMMIES: A BREAKDOWN OF THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY’S FIRST CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT
Marc Anthony Consalo*
June 8, 1977: Florida Governor Rubin Askew signed a bill which
banned same-sex couples from getting married or adopting children
in the State of Florida.1
May 29, 1997: Florida Governor Lawton Chiles withdrew his
opposition to a bill that becomes law banning the State of Florida
from recognizing same-sex marriages.2
November 4, 2008: By a sixty-two percent margin, Florida voters
passed a constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage
within the state.3
February 28, 2014: Jim Brenner and Chuck Jones file suit against
Governor Rick Scott demanding that the state recognize their 2009
marriage from Canada.4

* Marc Consalo is a faculty member with the University of Central Florida’s Legal
Studies Department. He teaches a variety of subjects including Domestic Law,
Foundations of Law, and Law and Society. He has also served as the Orange County Bar
Associations Family Law Committee’s Chair, Chair of the Florida Bar’s Grievance
Committee 9E, and as a member of the Florida Bar’s Traffic Rules Committee. Besides
teaching full time at the University of Central Florida, he has been a practicing attorney
in Orlando, Florida since 1999 graduating with Honors from the University of Florida
College of Law in 1999 and from Rollins College, summa cum laude, in 1996.
1
Rene Stutzman, Key Day For Same-Sex Marriage in Florida, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
(2015), available at http://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/breaking-news/os-gaymarriage-florida-timeline-20150105-story.html.
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
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July 17, 2014–August 5, 2014: Judges from Monroe, Miami-Dade,
Broward and Palm Beach counties independently ruled Florida’s
ban on same-sex marriage is unconstitutional but stay enforcement
of their rulings for appeals.5
August 21, 2014: United States District Judge Robert Hinkle ruled
in Brenner v. Scott that Florida’s ban on same sex marriage is
unconstitutional: he stayed his ruling but also puts a cap on how
long it will last—ninety days after the United States Supreme Court
weighs in on state same-sex marriage bans.6
Oct. 6, 2014: The United States Supreme Court refused to take up
Brenner v. Scott, triggering Judge Hinkle’s ninety-day countdown
to same-sex marriage in Florida on January 6th.7
January 6, 2015: Same-sex marriages became legal in the State of
Florida.8
The above timeline offers a glimpse of the ups and downs that the
same sex marriage debate has faced on its road to legalization in the
State of Florida. It is important to understand that at the time of writing
this article while currently legal, same-sex marriage still faces challenges
in both the Eleventh Federal Judicial Circuit and potentially the United
States Supreme Court.9 No matter what decision the courts ultimately
reach on the topic, like the Civil Rights movement of the 1960’s, it is
important to understand the conflict as it shapes not only our legal
landscape but also our future as Floridians.
This article will attempt to break down the debate between
opponents and proponents of same-sex marriage. It will begin by briefing
the cases of Loving v. Virginia and United States v. Windsor.10 These
cases are cited repeatedly as grounds for the decision to invalidate same
sex-marriage bans.11 Next, this article will explain the opponent’s
position in support of a ban against same-sex marriage, and the
5

Id.
Id.; Brenner v. Scott, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1294 (2014).
7
Brenner, 999 F. Supp. 2d at 1294; Armstrong v. Brenner, 135 S. Ct. 890 (2014);
Stutzman, supra note 1.
8
Stutzman, supra note 1.
9
See Matt Ford, The Supreme Court Will Decide If ‘Gay Marriage’ is Just
‘Marriage’, THE ATLANTIC, (2015), available at http://www.theatlantic.com/
politics/archive/2015/01/Supreme-Court-to-Hear-Four-Cases-on-Same-SexMarriage/384610/.
10
See 388 U.S. 1 (1967); 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
11
See Brenner, 999 F. Supp. 2d at 1286–87, 1289–91.
6
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proponent’s opposing arguments against the ban. Finally, this article will
provide an analysis of the Brenner v. Scott12 decision, its implications for
the State of Florida, and its potential path to the United States Supreme
Court.
LOVING V. VIRGINIA, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
It is ironic that the paramount case used in support of same-sex
marriage involves a party named Loving.13 The case centered on the
relationship between seventeen-year-old Mildred Jeter, who was black,
and her childhood sweetheart, twenty-three-year-old white construction
worker, Richard Loving.14 The two resided in Virginia, but journeyed to
Washington D.C. in 1958 to be wed.15 After the ceremony, they returned
to Virginia to live as a married couple.16 At the time, the State of
Virginia had outlawed marriage between blacks and whites—known as
“miscegenation” laws—the couple risked arrest and imprisonment due to
their relationship.17
In October of 1958, a grand jury was empaneled to investigate the
Lovings.18 Soon after, the grand jury issued an indictment, which
charged the Lovings with violating Virginia’s ban on interracial
marriages.19 Left with no alternatives, on January 6, 1959, the Lovings
pleaded guilty to the charge.20 They were sentenced to one year in jail;
suspended on the condition that the Lovings leave Virginia and not
return for twenty-five years.21 In rendering his decision, the trial judge
stated the following at the time of sentencing:
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and
red, and he placed them on separate continents. And, but for the
interference with his arrangement, there would be no cause for
such marriage. The fact that he separated the races shows that he
did not intend for the races to mix.22

The focus of the Lovings’ convictions centered on sections 258 and
259 of the Virginia Code.23 Section 258 read:
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

Id. at 1278.
See Loving, 388 U.S. at 2.
See Loving, 388 U.S. at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id.
See Loving, 388 U.S. at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 4–5.
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Leaving State to evade law.—If any white person and colored
person shall go out of this State, for the purpose of being married,
and with the intention of returning, and be married out of it, and
afterwards return to and reside in it, cohabiting as man and wife,
they shall be punished as provided in § 20–59, and the marriage
shall be governed by the same law as if it had been solemnized in
this State. The fact of their cohabitation here as man and wife
shall be evidence of their marriage.24
Section 259, which provided what the penalty for miscegenation
would be, stated: “Punishment for marriage. — If any white person
intermarry with a colored person, or any colored person intermarry with
a white person, he shall be guilty of a felony and shall be punished by
confinement in the penitentiary for not less than one nor more than five
years.”25 After their conviction, the Lovings moved to Washington
D.C.26 On November 6, 1963, they filed a motion in the Virginia state
court to vacate the judgment and set aside the sentence.27 Their argument
centered on the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.28 The
trial court took no action on the motion, therefore, on October 28, 1964,
the Lovings initiated a class action lawsuit.29 It was filed in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.30 The suit asked
that a three-judge panel be convened to review the statutes and find
Virginia’s anti-miscegenation statutes unconstitutional.31 The Lovings
also sought an injunction against state officials preventing the
enforcement of their convictions.32
On January 22, 1965, the state trial judge denied the November 6,
1963 motion to vacate.33 The Lovings appealed this decision to the
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.34 On February 11, 1965, the court
in the class action suit stayed its case to allow the Lovings to present
their constitutional claims to the highest state court.35 The Supreme Court
of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the state trial court’s decision.36 It
upheld the constitutionality of the anti-miscegenation statutes and
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36

Id. at 4.
Id. (emphasis in original).
See Loving, 388 U.S. at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Loving, 388 U.S. at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 3–4.
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affirmed their sentences.37 The Lovings appealed this decision to the
United States Supreme Court.38
In April 1967, the United States Supreme Court heard the parties’
arguments.39 The issue presented to the Court was whether statutes
preventing marriages between individuals of different races violated the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment.40 The Court ruled that the statutes were unconstitutional.41
In making its decision, the Court addressed Virginia’s concerns that the
regulation of marriage was a state’s rights issue, and that only the states
held this power under the Tenth Amendment.42 While the Court
conceded that a state does have police powers to regulate marriage, those
powers still must comply with the requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment.43 Virginia’s argument was that indeed, its “miscegenation”
laws did comply with such federal regulations as it punished whites and
blacks equally for the crime.44
The second argument by Virginia was that even if the Equal
Protection Clause does not outlaw miscegenation statutes, because of
their reliance on racial classifications, there was still a rational basis for a
state to discriminate against interracial marriages.45 Virginia conceded
there was lack of scientific evidence on the issue, but asked that the
Court “defer to the wisdom of the state legislature in adopting its policy
of discouraging interracial marriages.”46
The Court rejected Virginia’s argument that any rational basis for
the statute should result in its survival.47 A clear distinction had been
made in precedent regarding the analysis of laws concerning
discrimination based on race or other defining characteristics.48 In
Loving, it was clear that the only discernable quality used to outlaw the
marriage between a white man and a black woman was the color of their
skin.49 Thus, in recognizing this fundamental truth regarding Virginia’s

37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49

Id.
See Loving, 388 U.S. at 4.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 7.
Id.
See Loving, 388 U.S. at 8.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 10–12.
Id. at 11.
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“miscegenation” laws, the Court announced that the right to marry was a
fundamental right guaranteed to citizens by the Constitution.50
Marriage is one of the ‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to
our very existence and survival. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535, 541 (1942). See also Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
To deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as
the racial classifications embodied in these statutes,
classifications so directly subversive of the principle of equality
at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all
the State’s citizens of liberty without due process of law. The
Fourteenth Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to
marry not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations. Under
our Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of
another race resides with the individual, and cannot be infringed
by the State.51

UNITED STATES V. WINDSOR, 133 S. CT. 2675 (2013).
In 2007, Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer were lawfully married in
Ontario, Canada.52 They had been a couple since the early 1960’s and
registered as domestic partners in New York in 1993.53 Soon after their
wedding, the two returned to New York to cohabitate as a married
couple.54 Sadly, Spyer passed away in 2009.55 At the time of her death,
she left her entire estate to Windsor.56 Windsor sought to utilize the
estate tax exemption for surviving spouses, which excludes from taxation
“any interest in property which passes or has passed from the decedent to
his surviving spouse.”57 This would have enabled her to avoid paying
over $363,000.00 to the government; however, she was unable to do so
under federal law.58 The Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”) excluded
same-sex partners from the definition of “spouse” as that term is used in
federal statutes.59 Specifically, Section Three of DOMA reads:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any
ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative
bureaus and agencies of the United States, the word ‘marriage’
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59

See Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
Id.
U.S. v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682 (2013).
Id. at 2683.
Id. at 2682–83.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see 26 U.S.C. § 2056(a) (2015).
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2682–83.
Id. at 2682.
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means only a legal union between one man and one woman as
husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person
of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.60

Windsor paid the taxes as instructed, but filed suit to challenge the
constitutionality of the code; specifically, its limitation of the definition
of the term marriage.61 She argued that DOMA violated the guarantee of
equal protection, as applied to the Federal Government under the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.62
While the lawsuit was pending, the Attorney General of the United
States notified the Speaker of the House of Representatives that the
Department of Justice would not defend the lawsuit, all but alluding to
the unconstitutionality of Section Three of DOMA.63 Although “the
President . . . instructed the Department not to defend the statute in
Windsor,”64 he also decided, “that Section [Three] will continue to be
enforced by the Executive Branch” and that the United States had an
“interest in providing Congress a full and fair opportunity to participate
in the litigation of those cases.”65
In response, the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (“BLAG”) of the
House of Representatives voted to intervene in the litigation and decided
that it would defend the constitutionality of Section Three of DOMA.66
Eventually, the District Court permitted BLAG to intervene as an
interested party.67 On appeal, the United States District Court and the
Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Windsor by finding Section Three of
DOMA unconstitutional.68 They ordered the United States government to
refund Windsor’s money.69 After hearing arguments from both sides, the
United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court.70
In reaching this decision, the Court began by pointing out that the
State of New York already recognized same-sex marriages performed in
other jurisdictions.71 Therefore, the legality of Windsor’s marriage was
not at issue.72 The fact that New York recognized same-sex marriages

60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72

Id. at 2683.
Id. at 2683.
Id.
Id.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683.
Id. at 2684.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695-2696.
Id. at 2689.
Id.
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also illustrated the belief held by many, the states should regulate this
domain, not the Federal Government.73
However, the Court was quick to reject this contention pointing out
that during the same year it had affirmed a decision to allow a former
spouse to retain life insurance proceeds under a federal program that
gave her priority over the current wife by a second marriage.74 This was
an ideal example of the Federal Government preempting state law on the
relationship of a husband and a wife and gave the Federal Government
the ability to intervene in the instant case.75 This case set a clear
precedent for the argument that the Federal Government may trump the
state’s interest in regulating domestic relationships, clearly negating any
Tenth Amendment issue.76 Other precedents also existed involving
federal laws governing marriages and families.77 For instance, under 8
U.S.C. § 1186a(b)(1), immigration law invalidated marriages “entered
into for the purpose of procuring an alien’s admission [to the United
States] as an immigrant.”78 Also, Congress ordered that while state law
would determine who qualifies as an applicant’s spouse in establishing
income-based criteria for social security benefits, common-law marriages
would also be recognized, even though they may be illegal in a given
state.79 Therefore, while the Court admitted domestic law historically had
been the sole province of the states, it did so with the understanding that
federal constitutional protections and guarantees would still be
honored.80
In the Windsor case, the Court found that federal regulation did just
the opposite.81 Section Three of DOMA ignored constitutional
protections and negated New York’s attempt to ensure equal protection
to same-sex couples.82 In the Court’s own words, “DOMA writes
inequality into the entire United States Code.”83 The Court further
explained these inequalities that DOMA placed on same sex couples.84
Through its enactment, not only did DOMA prevent same-sex couples
from enjoying the surviving-spouse exemption through inheritance laws
73

See id. at 2690.
Id. at 2690 (citing Hillman v. Maretta, 133 S. Ct. 1943, 1955 (2013)).
75
Hillman, 133 S. Ct. at 1950 (citing Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 151
(2001)).
76
Id.
77
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2690.
78
Id.; see 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(b)(1) (2006).
79
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2690.; see 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(d)(2).
80
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2690.
81
Id. at 2693.
82
Id.
83
Id. at 2694.
84
Id.
74
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but also deprived them of the Bankruptcy Code’s special protections for
domestic-support obligations.85 Additionally, same-sex couples had to
adhere to a much more complicated procedure to file state and federal
taxes jointly.86 For same-sex couples that had a partner working for the
Federal Government, DOMA robbed them of specific protections for
crimes such as assault, kidnapping, and murder of “a member of the
immediate family.”87 DOMA also negatively affected children of samesex couples.88 It increased healthcare costs for families by taxing health
benefits provided by employers to their workers’ same-sex spouses and it
denied benefits allowed to families upon the loss of a spouse and
parent.89
Surprisingly, BLAG did not back down from this negative
characterization of DOMA nor of its inherently discriminatory purpose
in fighting to uphold the law.90 In fact, the Court remarked that BLAG
was “candid about the congressional purpose to influence or interfere
with state sovereign choices about who may be married.”91 A plain
reading of the law’s title illustrates that its purpose was to discourage
states from legalizing same-sex marriage and to further restrict same-sex
couples’ freedoms, if any state had the audacity to pass such a law.92
“The Act’s demonstrated purpose is to ensure that if any State decides to
recognize same-sex marriages, the union will be treated as second-class
marriages for purposes of federal law.”93 For the Court, this was the
clearest evidence of the unconstitutionality of the Act.94
The Court concluded that Congress could not enact a law to further
its personal views on what marriage should or should not be.95 In doing
so, the protections of Due Process were violated.96 Because the purpose
of DOMA was simply to “demean” same-sex couples.97 The Court found
no legitimate purpose that could overcome the blatant and unapologetic
attempt to disparage and injure those whom New York wanted to protect
by recognizing their union as married persons.98
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98

Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § § 101(14A), 507(a)(1)(A), 523(a)(5), 523(a)(15).
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694.
Id. at 2694–2695.
Id. at 2695.
Id.
Id. at 2693.
Id. at 2693.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693–2694.
Id. at 2693–2694.
Id. at 2694.
See id. at 2694–95.
Id. at 2694.
Id.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694-95

56

CHILD AND FAMILY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 3:47

The second to final line of the majority opinion is quite telling.
Justice Kennedy wrote, “[t]his opinion and its holding are confined to
those lawful marriages.”99 By doing so, with one pen stroke, he left open
the debate over same sex marriages. Yes, the Federal Government could
not limit marriages between a man and a woman; but could states still
choose to do so? Windsor and Spyer enjoyed the protections of the State
of New York and willingly provided them by recognizing their marriage
as legal.100
THE DEBATE
It is with this backdrop that we frame the debate between opponents
and proponents of same-sex marriage. Before we begin to take sides on
this highly contentious issue, it is necessary to dispel a common myth
held by most individuals. That myth requires a basic understanding of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Simply put, the
Government, whether at the federal level or state level, can
discriminate.101 The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution does not prevent discrimination.102 Rather, it simply sets the
rules and standards that must be observed when the government chooses
to discriminate.103 The greatest importance of this debate is that states
can prevent individuals from marrying.104 For instance, many states
prevent first cousins from wedding.105 Therefore, the question is not if
states can discriminate, but rather when they can discriminate when it
comes to marriage.
As it applies to the same-sex marriage debate, the Loving case has
taught us that the right to marry is a fundamental right guaranteed to
citizens of all states by the Federal Constitution.106 According to the
Supreme Court in Loving, enumerated rights that are incorporated are so
fundamental that any law restricting such a right must both serve a
compelling state purpose and be narrowly tailored to that compelling
purpose. As such, the same-sex marriage debate focuses squarely on one
major question: what compelling government interest exists to prevent
same-sex couples from marrying each other?
99

Id. at 2696.
Id. at 2683.
101
See Nebbia v. People of New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1943).
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Loving, 388 U.S. at 7.
105
DeBoer v. Synder, 772 F.3d 388, 413 (6th Cir. 2014); see Diane B. Paul & Hamish
G. Spencer, “It’s Ok, We’re Not Cousins by Blood”: The Cousin Marriage Controversy
in Historical Perspective, 6 PLOS BIOLOGY 2627, 2627 (2008).
106
Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
100
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Opponents of Same Sex Marriage
Opponents of same-sex marriage assert two reasons to satisfy the
requirement of a compelling government interest in the Loving case. The
first is the argument that the primary purpose of marriage is
procreation.107 The second is that permitting same-sex marriage
encourages violation of sodomy laws.108 They believe it would be
impossible for same-sex couples to express intimacy without violating
criminal laws illegalizing sodomy.109
Courts have long held that a connection exists between marriage
and procreation.110 For instance, in 1888, the United States Supreme
Court took the case of Maynard v. Hill where a question arose as to the
intestate succession of a husband’s estate and the ability of a legislature
to enact laws dealing with divorce.111 There, the Court took the
opportunity to argue that marriage is much more than a mere contract
between two consenting adults.112 The court remarked that marriage “is
the foundation of the family and of society, without which there would
be neither civilization nor progress.”113 Less than 100 years later in the
case of Skinner v. State of Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, the Supreme
Court again chose to speak on the connection of marriage and
procreation when entertaining an appeal on Oklahoma’s criminal
sterilization law.114 In that case, Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of
the Court writing, “[m]arriage and procreation are fundamental to the
very existence and survival of the race.”115 Language exists in the Loving
case professing this connection when the Court signaled that marriage
was “fundamental to our very existence and survival.”116 Finally, as
recently as 1978, the Supreme Court implied that marriage was “the
foundation of the family and of society,” through the case of Zablocki v.
Redhail.117
Before 1962, every state classified sodomy as a felony punished by
lengthy prison sentences.118 However, by 1986, when the United States
107

See Lawrence v. Texas 539 U.S. 558, 605 (2003) (Scalia, J., Dissenting).
See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 596 (Scalia, J., Dissenting); id. at 605.
See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 563.
110
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2718.
111
Maynard v. Hill, 125 US 190, 193, 203 (1888).
112
Id. at 205.
113
Id. at 211.
114
Skinner v. State, 316 US 535, 536 (1942).
115
Id. at 541.
116
Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
117
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 US 374, 384 (1978) (quoting Marynard v. Hill, 125 U.S.
190, 211 (1888)).
118
Don Gilleland, Guest Column: 50 Years of Change, Shifts in Culture Not Always
Predictable, FLORIDA TODAY (Jan 2, 2013, 11:23 AM), available at
108
109
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Supreme Court took up the constitutionality of sodomy laws in the case
of Bowers v. Hardwick119, approximately twenty-five states had legalized
the practice in some form.120 Yet in the Bowers case, the Supreme Court
chose to uphold the constitutionality of the law that made sodomy
illegal.121 The case focused on a Georgia sodomy law criminalizing oral
and anal sex in private between consenting adults when applied to
homosexuals.122
In August 1982, an Atlanta police officer cited Hardwick for public
drinking.123 Hardwick failed to appear in court for the citation and in
response the court issued an arrest warrant.124 Officers went to
Hardwick’s apartment to serve the warrant and found him having
consensual oral sex with another man.125 Police arrested both men for
sodomy, which was defined in Georgia law to include both oral sex and
anal sex between members of the same or opposite sex.126 Surprisingly,
the local district attorney did not pursue the charges.127 Therefore,
Hardwick decided to sue Michael Bowers, the Attorney General for
Georgia.128 He sued in federal court to declare the State’s sodomy law
invalid.129 In his pleadings, Hardwick claimed that as a “practicing
homosexual” he would eventually be prosecuted for his activities.130
Additionally, the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) became
involved in the case.131
Initially, Hardwick filed in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia, where it was dismissed, with the Court
ruling in favor of Attorney General Bowers.132 Hardwick then appealed
that decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh

http://www.floridatoday.com/article/20130103/COLUMNISTS0205/301030003/Guestcolumn-50-years-change (last visited September 20, 2015).
119
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 US 186, 188 (1986).
120
Id. at 196.
121
Id.
122
Id. at187–88.
123
Claude J. Summers & Craig Kazcorowski, Bowers v. Hardwock / Lawrence v.
Texas, GLBTQ: An Encyclopedia of Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer
Culture (Sept. 10, 2010), available at http://www.glbtq.com/socialsciences
/bowers_v_hardwick.html.
124
Id.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Bowers, 478 US at 187–88.
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Id. at 188.
131
SUMMERS ET AL., supra note 123.
132
Bowers, 478 US at 186.
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Circuit.133 that the District Court’s ruling was reversed and Georgia’s
sodomy statute was deemed unconstitutional.134 The State of Georgia
then appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States.135 The United
States Supreme Court ruled in favor of the State of Georgia.136 In
reaching their decision, the Court did not question the wisdom or legality
of the act of sodomy; rather the focus was on a state’s ability to pass laws
criminalizing the activity.137 More specifically, “[t]he issue presented is
whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon
homosexuals to engage in sodomy.”138 The Court found no right
existed.139
Proponents of Same Sex Marriage
Proponents are quick to point out flaws with the conservative view
in support of the ban on same sex marriage.140 In their minds, the purpose
of marriage being procreation lacks merit.141 For these individuals,
couples become married for a large variety of reasons that have nothing
to do with children.142 Some of these reasons include health insurance,
federal benefits, economic forces, and the simple notion of wanting to
spend your life with the person you love.143
Proponents also point out that if the entire purpose of marriage is to
procreate, then infertile individuals should equally be denied the ability
to marry.144 Having children should be a requirement for obtaining a
marriage license similar to a blood test.145 If a couple indicated that they
were unwilling to conceive a child, then they should be denied a
marriage license on par with a same-sex couple.146
As to the sodomy debate, the metaphoric wind has been taken out
of the sails of this argument through the case of Lawrence v. Texas.147
133

Id. at 186, 189.
Id. at 189.
135
Id.
136
Id. at 196.
137
Id. at 190.
138
Bowers, 478 US at 190.
139
Id. at190–91.
140
John G. Culhane, Uprooting The Arguments Against Same-Sex, 20 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1119, 11195 –96 (1999).
141
Id.
142
Nancy C. Polikoff, For The Sake Of All Children: Opponents And Supporters Of
Same-Sex Marriage Both Miss The Mark, 8 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 573, 589 (2005).
143
Id.
144
Monica H. Wallace & Christopher G. Otten, Marriage Equality: The “States” Of
The Law Post Windsor And Perry, 16 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L 239, 261 (2014).
145
See Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1220 (10th Cir. 2014).
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Rarely does the United States Supreme Court completely overturn its
own precedent.148 Yet, even more unusual is the relatively short amount
of time between the Bowers decision and the Lawrence decision.149
Bowers was decided in 1986.150 The Court overturned the Bowers
decision in the Lawrence case in 2003, less than twenty years later.151
In Lawrence, John Lawrence entertained two gay acquaintances in
his home near Houston, Texas in September 1998.152 The two
acquaintances had been in a romantic relationship with each other prior
to that evening but had broken-off the relationship.153 This enabled
Lawrence and one of the individuals to engage in sexual relations that
evening.154 This infuriated the other man.155 Seeking revenge, he called
the police and reported “a black male going crazy with a gun” at
Lawrence’s apartment.156 Four deputies arrived at the scene; however,
instead of finding a crazy, gun wielding black man, they found Lawrence
having anal sex in his bedroom with the other man.157 A second officer
reported seeing them engaged in oral sex, and two others did not report
seeing the pair having sexual intercourse.158 Upset, Lawrence argued
with the police for entering his home.159
At the time, Texas’s anti-sodomy statute read that “homosexual
conduct” was a misdemeanor and consisted of someone who “engages in
deviant sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex.”160
As such, law enforcement arrested Lawrence for “deviate sex”.161
At the trial level, Lawrence pled no contest to the charges and was
fined.162 He then appealed his conviction to a three-judge panel of the
Texas Fourteenth Court of Appeals.163 The Court heard the case on
148
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November 3, 1999, and found the statute unconstitutional.164 A majority
of judges ruled that the law violated the Equal Rights Amendment to the
Texas Constitution, which bars discrimination based on sex, race, color,
creed, or national origin.165 The Court of Appeals decided to review the
case en banc and on March 15, 2001, the appellate court reversed the
three-judge panel’s decision.166 Lawrence’s attorneys sought review by
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the highest appellate court in
Texas.167 After a year’s delay, on April 17, 2002, the request was
denied.168
On July 16, 2002, a Petition for Writ of Certiorari was filed with
the United States Supreme Court.169 The Court accepted jurisdiction.170
Presented to the Justices were three questions of great importance:
1. Whether the petitioners’ criminal convictions under the Texas
‘Homosexual Conduct’ law—which criminalizes sexual intimacy
by same-sex couples, but not identical behavior by different-sex
couples—violate the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal
protection of the laws? 2. Whether the petitioners’ criminal
convictions for adult consensual sexual intimacy in their home
violate their vital interests in liberty and privacy protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? 3. Whether
Bowers v. Hardwick should be overruled?171

Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion overturning Bowers.172 Kennedy
and the concurring Justices specifically found that homosexuals had a
protected liberty interest to engage in private, sexual activity.173
Furthermore, the sexual and moral choices of homosexuals enjoyed
constitutional protection.174 The majority’s moral disapproval of an
activity did not provide a legitimate justification for the criminalization
of sodomy.175
“The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The
State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making

164
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their private sexual conduct a crime[,]”176 Kennedy wrote. In reaching
the decision, the Court reviewed many of the arguments made by the
court in Bowers.177 The Court stated the belief that “[c]ondemnation of
[homosexual practices] is firmly rooted in Judeao-Christian moral and
ethical standards.”178 It also examined the legislative history that
criminalized certain sexual practices, and cited the Model Penal Code’s
recommendations since 1955, the Wolfenden Report of 1963, and a 1981
decision of the European Court of Human Rights.179
However, the majority concluded that intimate, adult, consensual
conduct whether sexual or not, constituted a liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process protections.180 Kennedy stated the
Constitution protects “personal decisions relating to marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationships, [and] child rearing” and
that homosexuals “may seek autonomy for these purposes.”181
What is a marriage?
A third issue that has arisen from the same-sex marriage debate is
the definition of a marriage to begin with.182 In a sense, opponents of
same-sex marriage believe the protection and integrity of the traditional
definition of marriage should be a compelling government interest.183
Such an argument is so novel, yet, so important to the concept of equal
protection jurisprudence that it deserves special attention.
While several jurisdictions have implied protecting the “traditional”
definition of marriage is of the utmost importance, none have been as
straight forward as the State of Utah in the case of Kitchen v. Herbert.184
The case focused on the same-sex couple of Derek Kitchen and Moudi
Sbeity.185 The two had been in a monogamous, committed relationship
for several years while living in Salt Lake City, Utah.186 Despite applying
for and being denied a marriage license, the two sought recognition of
their relationship from one of the most conservative states in the
Country187
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
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In March 2013, Kitchen, along with other same-sex couple
plaintiffs sued the Governor and Attorney General of Utah, as well as the
clerk of Salt Lake County, in their official capacities.188 Their suit
challenged three provisions of Utah law relating to same-sex marriage.189
First, Utah Code section 30–1–2(5) reads marriages that are “prohibited
and declared void” are those “between persons of the same sex.”190
Second, in 2004, the Utah Legislature passed section 30–1–4.1, which
read:
(1)(a) It is the policy of this state to recognize as marriage only
the legal union of a man and a woman as provided in this chapter.
(b) Except for the relationship of marriage between a man and a
woman recognized pursuant to this chapter, this state will not
recognize, enforce, or give legal effect to any law creating any
legal status, rights, benefits, or duties that are substantially
equivalent to those provided under Utah law to a man and a
woman because they are married.
(2) Nothing in Subsection (1) impairs any contract or other
rights, benefits, or duties that are enforceable independently of
this section.191

Finally, the State Legislature provided a proposed constitutional
amendment to its electorate, known as Amendment Three.192 It states:
“(1) Marriage consists only of the legal union between a man and a
woman. (2) No other domestic union, however denominated, may be
recognized as a marriage or given the same or substantially equivalent
legal effect.”193 Amendment Three passed with approximately sixty-six
percent (66%) of the vote and became section twenty-nine of Article I of
the Utah Constitution.194
After dealing with some preliminary questions, the Tenth Circuit
espoused on the definition of marriage over the years. It started its
examination with the 1972 United States Supreme Court case of Baker v.
Nelson.195 There, the Court upheld a ban on same-sex marriage and
defined the concept as “[t]he institution of marriage as a union of man
and woman, uniquely involving the procreation and rearing of children
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195

Kitchen, 755 F.3d at 1200.
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within a family, is as old as the book of Genesis” and that “[t]he due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not a charter for
restructuring [the institution of marriage] by judicial legislation.”196 In
regards to the Equal Protection argument, the Court wrote “[t]here is no
irrational or invidious discrimination” because “in commonsense and in a
constitutional sense, there is a clear distinction between a marital
restriction based merely upon race and one based upon the fundamental
difference in sex.”197
This analysis honed in on the State of Utah’s main argument.198 In
rejecting requests to approve samesex marriages, the State believed it
was preserving the traditional definition of the term.199 The State argued
that the term “marriage” by its nature prevented same-sex couples from
marrying.200 Citing the Glucksberg201 decision, Utah believed that the
court’s opinion depended upon the development of a “‘careful
description of the asserted fundamental liberty interest,’ relying on ‘[o]ur
Nation’s history, legal traditions, and practices [to] provide the crucial
guideposts for responsible decision making.’”202
The Tenth Circuit rejected this claim, reasoning that if the Court
was restricted to defining marriage based upon its historical application,
not only would same sex couples be denied the right to marry, but so
would interracial couples.203
To claim that marriage, by definition, excludes certain couples is
simply to insist that those couples may not marry because they
have historically been denied the right to do so. One might just
as easily have argued that interracial couples are by definition
excluded from the institution of marriage. But ‘neither history
nor tradition could save a law prohibiting miscegenation from
constitutional attack.’204

The Court also referred to the Lawrence decision,205 reminding the
State of Utah that the moral majority is not how the law is defined but
rather a starting point for an equal protection analysis.206 With this in
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mind, the Tenth Circuit found Utah’s ban unconstitutional.207 This
decision clearly stands for the proposition that defending tradition is not
a compelling government interest.208 This is especially true when that
tradition stands for centuries of discrimination and bigotry.
BRENNER V. SCOTT, 999 F. SUPP. 2D 1278 (N.D. FLA. 2014).
The Brenner case consisted of twenty-two different plaintiffs from
two consolidated cases, which included nine same sex couples.209 Many
of these couples were legally married in various jurisdictions such as
New York, the District of Columbia, Iowa, Massachusetts, and
Canada.210 There was also a surviving spouse of a New York same-sex
marriage and two individuals who had been in a same-sex relationship
for fifteen years wishing to marry in Florida.211 Judge Robert Lewis
Hinkle heard the case.212
The namesake of the case was James D. Brenner (“Mr. Brenner”)
who wanted to marry his partner Charles D. Jones (“Mr. Jones”).213 Mr.
Brenner had been an employee of the State of Florida since 1981 and Mr.
Jones worked for the Florida Department of Education since 2003.214 The
parties married in Canada in 2009, however, the State of Florida refused
to recognize the marriage.215 By doing this, the State would be denying
retirement benefits to Mr. Jones after Mr. Brenner’s death.216
The defendants consisted of five different entities and
individuals.217 Brenner sued the Governor, the Attorney General, the
Surgeon General, the Secretary of the Department of Management
Services, and the Clerk of Court of Washington County, Florida.218 All
defendants were sued in their official capacities.219 In Brenner’s view,
they all played a part in denying him the ability to marry in Florida.220
Brenner argued that Florida’s ban on same-sex marriage violated
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection
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Clauses.221 More specifically, Brenner’s challenge, as to the Equal
Protection claim, argued that the ban discriminated based on sexual
orientation.222 He also argued that his First Amendment right of
association had been infringed upon.223
Brenner challenged Article I, section twenty-seven, of the Florida
Constitution, and Florida Statutes section 741.212 and section
741.04(1).224 Article I, section twenty-seven provides: “Marriage
defined—Inasmuch as marriage is the legal union of only one man and
one woman as husband and wife, no other legal union that is treated as
marriage or the substantial equivalent thereof shall be valid or
recognized.”225 Florida Statutes section 741.212 provides:
(1) Marriages between persons of the same sex entered into in
any jurisdiction, whether within or outside the State of Florida,
the United States, or any other jurisdiction, either domestic or
foreign, or any other place or location, or relationships between
persons of the same sex which are treated as marriages in any
jurisdiction, whether within or outside the State of Florida, the
United States, or any other jurisdiction, either domestic or
foreign, or any other place or location, are not recognized for any
purpose in this state.
(2) The state, its agencies, and its political subdivisions may not
give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any
state, territory, possession, or tribe of the United States or of any
other jurisdiction, either domestic or foreign, or any other place
or location respecting either a marriage or relationship not
recognized under subsection (1) or a claim arising from such a
marriage or relationship.
(3) For purposes of interpreting any state statute or rule, the term
“marriage” means only a legal union between one man and one
woman as husband and wife, and the term “spouse” applies only
to a member of such a union.226

Florida Statutes section 741.04(1) provides, “[n]o county court
judge or clerk of the circuit court in this state shall issue a license for the
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marriage of any person . . . unless one party is male and the other party is
female.”227
Initially, the State countered by filing a motion to dismiss.228 It
argued that Mr. Brenner lacked standing to bring forth the suit and that
the defendant’s names were improper.229 The Court agreed in part with
this motion, dismissing the complaint against the Governor and the
Attorney General.230 Yet, the court remarked, “[i]f it turns out later that
complete relief cannot be afforded against the Secretary and Surgeon
General, any necessary and proper additional defendant can be added.”231
With this resolved, the court turned to the merits of Mr. Brenner’s
argument.232 First, the court focused on a state’s rights concern.233 In
part, Governor Scott asserted that the decision to deny or permit same
sex-marriage was solely in the prevue of the state government.234 The
federal government could not interfere with such a decision.235 The court
quickly pointed to the Loving case as a prime example where the federal
government could and had interfered with the state’s right to police
marriage.236 The Court remarked that the Fourteenth Amendment had
been created after the Civil War:
for the express purpose of protecting rights against encroachment
by state governments. By that time it was well established that a
federal court had the authority—indeed, the duty—to strike down
an unconstitutional statute when necessary to the decision in a
case or controversy properly before the court. The State of
Florida has itself asked federal courts to do so. So the suggestion
that this is just a federalism case—that the state’s laws are
beyond review in federal court—is a nonstarter.237

Next, the Court reverted to a traditional examination of
discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause.238 The first step was to
determine the proper test in deciding if discrimination by the state was
proper.239 This focused on the issue of whether the right to marry was a
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fundamental right under the Constitution.240 Citing the Loving case, the
Court found clearly it was.241 In fact, since the Loving case courts, in
several jurisdictions repeatedly found that the right to marry was
fundamental.242 “Indeed, the Court has sometimes listed marriage as the
very paradigm of a fundamental right.”243
With this established, the next step was to determine if the State of
Florida’s ban would pass strict scrutiny.244 Under equal protection
jurisprudence, the government can discriminate against a fundamental
right through means that are narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest.245 As to what compelling state interest Florida had in continuing
with its same sex marriage ban, the state resorted to the procreation
argument used by most other jurisdictions.246 The Court rejected this
argument.247 It found no historical precedent where Florida required
procreation as a condition of marriage.248 The evidence as to this issue
was clear as individuals who are medically unable to procreate, who are
beyond child-bearing age, and individuals who voluntarily or
involuntarily become medically unable to procreate, are allowed to marry
and remain married.249 “In short, the notion that procreation is an
essential element of a Florida marriage blinks reality.”250
The Court went so far as to imply that the procreation argument
was a “pretext” and the true argument against same-sex marriage focused
on a moral disapproval of the practice.251 “The undeniable truth is that
the Florida ban on same-sex marriage stems entirely, or almost entirely,
from moral disapproval of the practice.”252 Falling back on the Lawrence
decision, the court reminded the State that the moral majority does not
240

Id.
Id.
242
See id. at 1288.
243
Id.; see, e.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720 (refusing to recognize assisted suicide as
a fundamental right, listing rights that do qualify as fundamental, and placing the right to
marry first on the list); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (including
the right to marry in the fundamental right to privacy); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel.
Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541, (1942) (labeling marriage “one of the basic civil rights of
man”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (saying that “[w]ithout doubt” the
right “to marry” is within the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause); Maynard v.
Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205, (1888) (labeling marriage “the most important relation in life”).
244
Id.
245
Brenner, 999 F. Supp. 2d at 1288.
246
Id.
247
See id. at 1289.
248
Id.
249
Id.
250
Id. at 1289.
251
See Brenner, 999 F. Supp. 2d at 1289.
252
Id.
241

2015]

The Same Sex Marriage Debate for Dummies

69

constitute a compelling state interest.253 As such, the court found
Florida’s ban unconstitutional.254
FLORIDA’S FUTURE
On August 21, 2014, the court issued a preliminary injunction
forbidding the State of Florida from banning same-sex marriage.255 Yet
in the same breath, the Court temporarily stayed the injunction until it
was decided if the three same-sex marriage cases that at that time had
petitioned for the United States Supreme Court to hear them would be
heard (Bostic, Bishop, and Kitchen) and for ninety-one days thereafter.256
In the meantime, the State appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.257
However, on October 7, 2014, the United States Supreme Court
rejected the request to hear Bostic, Bishop, and Kitchen.258 Soon after,
Mr. Brenner filed a motion requesting Judge Hinkle to lift his stay before
the ninety-one-day period under the original order.259 The State objected
and Judge Hinkle rejected Mr. Brenner’s request on November 5,
2014.260
On November 19, 2014, the State asked the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals to extend Judge Hinkle’s stay pending appeal.261 On
December 3, 2014, the Eleventh Circuit refused that request.262 On
December 15, 2014, the State renewed its request to the Eleventh Circuit,
to stay Judge Hinkle’s preliminary injunction.263 Florida’s Attorney
General, Pam Bondi, made her request based upon the need for
uniformity within the state.264 Specifically, she argued that Judge
253
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Hinkle’s ruling only applied to Washington County, the named defendant
in the suit, and not the sixty-six other clerks throughout the state.265 On
December 19, 2014 this request was denied.266
On December 23, 2014, the Washington County Clerk of Court
filed an emergency motion asking for clarification of Hinkle’s order.267
Did the clerk need to issue a marriage license only to Brenner plaintiffs
or to all same-sex marriage couples?268 On December 24, 2014, Judge
Hinkle issued an order, which stated his injunction applied to “the
Secretary of the Department of Management Services, the Surgeon
General, and their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys—
and others in active concert or participation with any of them.”269 A
deadline of December 29, 2014 was provided for the Secretary to argue
the effect of the original injunction.270 On January 1, 2015, Judge Hinkle
explained the scope of his injunction, writing that the Florida
Constitution requires all Florida clerks to issue licenses to same-sex
couples, and that while clerks are free to interpret his ruling differently,
they should anticipate lawsuits if they fail to issue such licenses.271
The preliminary injunction now in effect thus does not require
the Clerk to issue licenses to other applicants. But as set out
in the order that announced issuance of the preliminary
injunction, the Constitution requires the Clerk to issue such
licenses. As in any other instance involving parties not now
before the court, the Clerk’s obligation to follow the law arises
from sources other than the preliminary injunction.272
On January 6, 2015, Judge Hinkle’s stay ended and same-sex
marriages began throughout Florida.273 While all clerks issued licenses to
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same-sex couples on this date, clerks in thirteen counties–Baker,
Calhoun, Clay, Duval, Franklin, Holmes, Jackson, Liberty, Okaloosa,
Pasco, Santa Rosa, Wakulla, and Washington–indicated that they would
no longer provide courthouse wedding services to avoid having to
officiate at the wedding of same-sex couples.274 Officially, this was done
to spare the awkwardness for clerk personnel.275
WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS?
At the time of writing this article, the Brenner case sits before the
Eleventh Circuit awaiting further argument.276 However, on January 16,
2015, the United States Supreme Court announced it would hear cases
involving same-sex marriage from four other circuits.277 Two questions
will be decided by the Court.278 The first is whether same-sex marriage is
or is not legal—more specifically, does the Equal Protection Clause
invalidate same-sex marriage bans?279 The second question focuses on
the Full Faith and Credit Clause.280 Here, the Court will decide whether a
state has to honor same-sex marriages from other states?281 Both
questions will strike at the very heart of the same sex marriage debate.
Many legal scholars believe the decision will rest on the shoulders
of Justice Anthony Kennedy.282 At seventy-six years old, no one knows
exactly how Justice Kennedy will vote; yet, many believe that based on
his prior record, it is likely he will fall in favor of same-sex marriages.283
However, no one can know for sure. Justice Kennedy has spoken often of
274
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his belief that government should have “dignity” for gay individuals.284
While at the same time, as a President Reagan appointee, he is a staunch
supporter of state’s rights over the federal government.285 Only time will
tell if this one swing vote will alter the course of history for
approximately nine million Americans who identify themselves as gay or
lesbian.286
CONCLUSION
It is quite possible that by the time this article is published, the
debate will be over and gay marriage will fade into the history books as
the Twenty-First Century’s First Civil Rights Movement. But whether
gays and lesbians marry, whether the “traditional” definition of marriage
survives, the depth and breadth of equal protection jurisprudence has
been changed forever. Courts in all states, and at all levels, now have
more guidance than ever in defining fundamental rights. No longer are
we limited to a strict reading of the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, or
individual state mandates to define this concept. We now have precedent
from several courts expanding the traditional idea of liberty.
Maybe, fundamental rights are so innate, so truly basic, that it is
impossible to list all of them in the volumes of American legal
jurisprudence. Like legal scholars say of the United States’ Constitution;
it is a living, breathing document, which is constantly changing.287 But
perhaps the life breathed into the document comes from those strong
enough to stand up for themselves against the majority. Perhaps the
change is not in what the document says, but in what we as “the people”
are willing to ask from it.
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